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The financial crisis that began in 2007 precipitated a fierce
recession that led, as in many other countries, to a dramatic
reduction in UK output.  According to the latest Monetary
Policy Committee projections in the May 2010 Inflation Report,
output is likely to remain substantially below the level implied
by a continuation of its pre-crisis trend over the next three
years (Chart 1).  Much of that shortfall is likely to reflect a
persistent reduction in the supply capacity of the economy.(2)
This article considers the impact of financial crises on supply
and the potential channels through which supply may have
been affected during the recent recession.
Understanding the impact of the recession on supply is
important for monetary policy.  In the medium term, inflation
is determined by the balance between nominal demand and
the effective potential supply capacity of the economy.
Potential supply cannot be observed directly.  But its evolution
will shape both the degree of spare capacity available to
companies and the slack in the labour market, which in turn
influence companies’ pricing and wage-setting decisions and,
hence, future inflation.
A number of recent studies have examined how medium-term
output and, perhaps, potential supply may have been affected
by past financial crises.  These are reviewed in the first section
of the article.  The second section explains in more detail the
approach to model supply developments which is adopted in
this article before the subsequent section explores the
channels through which supply might have been affected.  The
final section concludes by briefly discussing the implications
for future developments in potential supply.
Learning from the past:  studies of how output
responds to financial crises
The latest downturn has been triggered by an unprecedented,
globally synchronised financial crisis, and many industrialised
countries have experienced large falls in output.  But the
response of inflation depends in part on how supply capacity
reacts.  Consequently, several policy and research institutions
around the world have published recent studies on the
behaviour of potential supply. 
Output fell sharply in the United Kingdom during the recent global financial crisis, some of which is
likely to have reflected a contraction in the economy’s supply capacity.  This article considers the
impact of financial crises on supply and the potential channels through which supply may have been
affected during the recent recession.  It is likely that the downturn has resulted in a fall in
companies’ effective supply capacity although the magnitude of that impairment is difficult to
gauge.  
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Chart 1 Projection of the level of GDP based on market
interest rate expectations and £200 billion asset
purchases — May 2010 Inflation Report(a)
(a) Chained-volume measure.  This chart is derived from the corresponding projection for GDP
growth.  For a description of the Bank of England’s fan chart for GDP growth, and for details
of the assumptions underlying it, see the footnote to Chart 1 on page 7 of the Bank’s 
May 2010 Inflation Report.  The width of this fan over the past has been calibrated to be
consistent with the four-quarter growth fan chart, under the assumption that revisions to
quarterly growth are independent of the revisions to previous quarters.  Over the forecast,
the mean and modal paths for the level of GDP are consistent with the fan chart for GDP
growth.  So the skews for the level fan chart have been constructed from the skews in the
four-quarter growth fan chart at the one, two and three-year horizons.  This calibration also
takes account of the likely path dependency of the economy, where, for example, it is judged
that shocks to GDP growth in one quarter will continue to have some effect on GDP growth
in successive quarters.  This assumption of path dependency serves to widen the fan chart.Research and analysis The impact of the financial crisis on supply 105
Most of these studies infer the likely response of potential
supply by examining past financial crises and recessions.
Potential supply is unobservable but, over time, movements in
actual supply may provide a useful proxy for movements in
supply capacity.  Some studies draw on data sets that cover a
range of countries and periods (IMF (2009a), Furceri and
Mourougane (2009) and Cerra and Saxena (2008)).  Others
use more of a case-study approach, focusing on individual
cases in greater detail (European Commission (2009) and
OECD (2009)).  In summarising this literature, three broad
findings emerge.
First, financial crises are associated with a persistent loss of
output relative to its level had the crises not occurred 
(Table A).  Estimates of the size of output loss differ, reflecting
differences in both methodology and coverage.  For example,
the IMF (2009a) estimates an average output loss of 10%
relative to a trend level, while research from the OECD
suggests the impact is much smaller on average, at around 2%
(Furceri and Mourougane (2009)).   
Second, experiences differ widely across countries.  For
example, even setting to one side the more extreme responses
in the IMF (2009a) study, the range of impacts for the central
half of cases was no less than -26% to +6%.  The response of
different economies appears to depend on certain
characteristics, such as the demographic and industrial
structures of the country and its political system, as well as on
the fiscal and monetary policy response to the crisis.  In some
cases, the impact on supply has been more persistent than in
others.  For example, there appeared to be a persistent impact
on growth in Japan following the financial crisis in the early
1990s so that the size of the output loss grew over time.(1) But
there appeared to be only a temporary impact on output
growth in Finland and Sweden following their financial crises
(European Commission (2009) and Haugh et al (2009)).
Third, output losses tend to be bigger and longer lasting when
recessions are accompanied by financial crises, as compared
with normal recessions.  For example, research from the OECD
found that output losses after severe financial crises are
typically around two times greater than after less severe crises
(Furceri and Mourougane (2009)).  The IMF (2009b) also found
that recessions associated with financial crises are longer and
generally more costly than others.  Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
also highlight the persistent weakness in output following
financial crises.  With all these studies, however, differentiating
between the impact of a financial crisis and a ‘normal’
recession is difficult given that financial crises can frequently
be accompanied by recessions.
While these explorations of past crises can provide a useful
benchmark for the most recent episode, the results should be
treated with some caution.  Actual output is a useful proxy for
potential supply only once inflation has stabilised and the
economy has regained the balance between demand and
potential supply.  And the size of output loss is typically
measured relative to an estimated pre-crisis trend path, which
is difficult to pin down.  For example, estimates that
extrapolated the pace of growth immediately prior to the crisis
may inadvertently include periods of unsustainably high
growth, which can lead to overestimates of the size of output
loss.
Despite these difficulties, most of the available evidence
suggests that financial crises and associated recessions have 
a negative and long-lasting effect on the supply capacity of 
the economy.  In particular, among estimates for the 
United Kingdom in the context of the current crisis, in their
Green Budget, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (2010) estimated
a persistent output loss of around 71/@%.  This is greater than 
HM Treasury’s (2010) estimates, which pointed to a
deterioration in supply of around 5%.  The remainder of the
article goes on to examine the channels through which supply
in the United Kingdom may have deteriorated during the
recent financial crisis and associated recession.
Medium-term potential supply from the
growth accounting approach
Although potential supply is unobservable, there are a number
of approaches that can be used to estimate it.  Some of these
imply measures that respond more quickly to changes in the
economic environment than others (see the box on page 106).
This article focuses on a concept of potential supply built up
from the component parts — labour supply, capital services
and productivity — and so is consistent with a ‘growth
accounting’ approach.(2) This approach acknowledges that
movements in supply — like output itself — may be influenced
by the business cycle, and so it is well suited for analysing the
effects of the crisis and the recession on supply.  
An example of this framework can be seen by decomposing
changes in actualGDP.  But it is important to recognise that
this only provides a decomposition of actual supply and not
Table A Output losses following financial crises
Study Change in output Description
IMF (2009a) -10% Average output loss seven 
years after a financial crisis. 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) -7.5% Average output loss ten years 
after a financial crisis.
Furceri and Mourougane (2009) -1.5% to -2.4% Average loss in potential 
output five years after a 
financial crisis. 
Sources:  Cerra and Saxena (2008), Furceri and Mourougane (2009) and IMF (2009a).
(1) Extrapolating high growth rates in Japan prior to the crisis may, however, lead to an
overestimate of the effects of the crisis.
(2) For an example of this approach, see the box entitled ‘The impact of the dislocation in
financial markets on potential supply’ on page 28 of the May 2008 Inflation Report.106 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
Concepts of supply
Conceptually, it is relatively straightforward to measure how
much companies are producing and, hence, their actual output
or supply.  But it is much harder to gauge the quantity
companies would ideally like to produce given the economic
environment, and how that may evolve over time.  This is
unobservable and hence must be inferred.  This box explores a
number of different ways to estimate potential supply.
Three broad approaches to measuring potential supply have
been identified in the economics literature.  They can be
classified according to the speed with which potential supply
responds to changes in the economic environment.  At one end
of the spectrum are trend-fitting approaches, which treat
potential output as relatively slow moving.  At the other end of
the spectrum are those approaches in which short-term
factors are allowed to affect potential supply, resulting in
volatile estimates.  In between is the ‘growth accounting’
approach.
Trend-fitting approaches use a variety of statistical techniques
to estimate potential supply.  These techniques typically
smooth through variations in output, resulting in estimates of
potential output growth that are close to some historical
average and relatively slow moving.  Examples include linear
trend estimates, first differencing, fitted polynomials in time,
peak-to-peak interpolation, and Hodrick-Prescott and 
band-pass filters.(1) While these methods provide useful
practical estimates, they usually have little basis in economic
theory.  They are also sensitive to the choice of sample period
over which they are estimated, with more recent estimates —
which are of greater relevance for policymakers — particularly
susceptible to subsequent revision.
An alternative approach is a ‘bottom-up’ analysis.  The amount
that a business can produce depends on the number of people
it employs, along with its capital or technical infrastructure.
But its output will also depend on the efficiency with which its
workforce can use the technology available — the company’s
total factor productivity.  The ‘growth accounting’ approach
uses this framework to analyse how these components, and
hence aggregate supply, evolve over time.
Under the third approach, short-term factors are allowed to
affect businesses’ potential supply.  For example, models (such
as those in the ‘New Keynesian’ literature) can be used to
measure potential supply as the ‘flexible price level of output’
— that is, the level of output that would exist if prices were
able to change immediately.  In this case, sudden changes to
the real economy can result in sharp movements in estimates
of potential supply.  And since these changes are unlikely to be
smooth, neither will be the path of potential output.  As a
result, variations in potential output account for a greater
degree of the variation in actual output.(2)
An alternative concept in which short-term factors can
influence supply is based on the notion that companies may be
constrained by difficulties in accessing finance.  Businesses
typically use working capital to fund their day-to-day business
activities.  But if credit lines dry up and businesses are unable
to access working capital, they may be constrained in the
amount they can ‘effectively’ supply.(3) Working capital can, in
theory, be analysed within the growth accounting framework
as another factor that companies need to produce output.
And quantitative theoretical models can also be constructed
that shed light on the impact of the working capital channel.(4)
Finally, during periods of rapid restructuring, the supply
capacity of the economy may be reduced if it is costly and
takes time to shift production to newer, faster-growing sectors.
This is another way in which potential supply may be affected
in the near term and is sometimes referred to as ‘speed limit
effects’ (Walsh (2003)).  Seminal work in this area is
attributable to Gordon (1980), who argued that US inflation is
better explained when considering the rate of change of a
measure of potential supply.
(1) See, for example, Hodrick and Prescott (1997), Canova (1998), Stock and Watson
(1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003).
(2) See, for example, Neiss and Nelson (2005).
(3) See Blinder (1987) for a discussion of ‘effective’ supply.
(4) See, for example, Kiyotaki and Moore (2008).
potential supply.  It reflects what inputs go into meeting the
current level of demand with domestic output.
Much of the variation in output over the economic cycle
reflects movements in total factor productivity (TFP) 
(Chart 2), which, in theory, captures the efficiency with which
businesses can combine labour and capital to produce output.
But TFP is unobservable and so, in practice, is estimated as a
residual.  The strongly procyclical pattern to TFP may reflect 
a range of factors.  For example, companies may be reluctant
to lay employees off during economic downturns due to the
costs associated with changing headcount.(1) This will be
reflected in lower productivity and hence weaker TFP.  In
contrast, during periods of economic expansion, employees
generally raise levels of effort and capital is used more
intensively.  These variations in the intensity with which
companies use their labour and capital may not be captured in
the headline capital and labour input data, and will show up
instead as higher TFP.
(1) For a comparison of the response of the labour market in this recession relative to
previous downturns, see Faccini and Hackworth (2010).Research and analysis The impact of the financial crisis on supply 107
Much of the remainder of the variation in output reflects
changes in unemployment.  In particular, the fall in actual
output during the early 1990s recession was accompanied by
higher unemployment.  Faced with lower demand for their
products, some businesses may lay off employees during
economic downturns.  Alongside this, the average number of
hours worked typically falls back in recessions as companies
look for ways to adjust the amount of labour input.  And the
share of the population willing to work also tends to fall back
in recessions as people become discouraged about their
chances of finding a job.
Translating this framework into an estimate of potential supply
is, unfortunately, much more difficult.  In any economy, the
level of potential output is a moving target, partly because the
economy grows over time, but also because changing
circumstances have effects in the medium term.  So the level
of potential supply can be thought of as an equilibrium path
towards which actual output will tend to gravitate in the
medium term.  Medium-run values of different supply
components can be estimated, but they are not directly
observable.  Therefore, an assessment of how these 
medium-run values are likely to change will be based on
economic theory and how the current values of the inputs
evolve.  The next section will use this growth accounting
approach to explore the channels through which potential
supply may have been affected in the recent recession.
The impact of the financial crisis and recession
on potential supply
Overall, it is likely that the effective supply capacity of the
economy has been impaired since the start of the financial
crisis.  Inflation has been resilient.  And surveys of capacity
utilisation do not appear to have fallen by as much as the fall
in output might suggest (Chart 3).  This section uses the
growth accounting framework to examine the channels
through which each component of supply — labour, capital
and the TFP residual — might have been affected in the
recession. 
Labour supply
The amount of labour used to produce goods and services can
be measured by the total number of hours worked in the
economy.  This can be decomposed into:  (i) the size of the
population;  (ii) the share of that population willing and able to
work;  (iii) the share of those people actually in work;  and 
(iv) the average number of hours worked by those employed.(1)
But for potential supply, it is the medium-term equilibrium
levels of these components that are most relevant. 
Size of the population
Population growth has been relatively strong in recent years,
and is likely to have made a significant contribution to the
growth of potential labour supply in the United Kingdom.
Rising population can reflect either natural change or increases
in net inward migration, both of which have picked up over the
past decade (Chart 4).  In 2008, natural change exceeded net
inward migration for the first time in nine years, as net inward
migration edged down and births continued to rise.
Natural change in the population, influenced by changes in
fertility, life expectancy and age composition, typically occurs






















Chart 2 Contributions to annual growth of actual
supply(a)*
Sources:  ONS (including the Labour Force Survey) and Bank calculations.
(a) Chained-volume measure of gross domestic product at market prices.  The decomposition is
only available to 2009 Q4.
(b) Population data are non seasonally adjusted.
* This chart differs from the version originally published, for which the participation and total 
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Chart 3 GDP growth and capacity utilisation surveys
Sources:  Bank of England, British Chambers of Commerce (BCC), Confederation of British
Industry (CBI), CBI/PricewaterhouseCoopers and ONS.
(a) Three measures are produced by weighting together surveys from the Bank’s Agents
(manufacturing and services), the BCC (manufacturing and services) and the CBI
(manufacturing, financial services, business/consumer services, distributive trades) using
shares in nominal value added.  The BCC data are non seasonally adjusted.
(b) Chained-volume measure at market prices.
(1) As the arguments for how ‘potential hours’ might respond in a recession can work in
either direction, we do not explicitly discuss this component.
(2) See Barwell et al (2007).108 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
sensitive to the economic cycle.  But the degree of net inward
migration is likely to have stronger links with the state of the
economy.  
Inward migration increases the population directly.  And it 
may have a further impact on labour supply if immigrants
differ from the typical UK resident (and those leaving the 
United Kingdom) in terms of how likely they are to participate
in the labour market.(1) The incentive to migrate may partly
reflect cyclical differences in wages and the probability of
finding work in different countries.  During periods of relative
cyclical weakness, net inward migration may therefore be
lower than otherwise.  
The financial crisis has been a global phenomenon.  So while
the cyclical position of the UK economy has been affected, it is
less clear to what extent it has changed relative to other
countries.  If the attractiveness of the United Kingdom as a
destination for migrants had declined, then that would be
consistent with the slowdown in net inward migration
indicated by ONS data up to 2009 (Chart 5).  In addition,
sterling’s depreciation — of around 25% since the start of
2007 — will have made nominal pay in the United Kingdom
worth less in terms of foreign currencies, which may also serve
to discourage net inward migration.
Participation
The proportion of people that are willing and able to work is an
important element of labour supply.  The participation rate —
the number of people working or seeking work, as a
percentage of the adult population — tends to fall during an
economic downturn (Chart 6) for a number of reasons.(2) For
example, individuals may be discouraged from looking for
work during a recession when the likelihood of finding a job is
lower.  Reduced job opportunities may imply a stronger motive
to do ‘non-market’ work, such as caring for relatives or
investing in education as an alternative.  And weaker real wage
growth may mean people are less willing to supply labour.
Recessions may, however, have other effects that actually
encourage participation in the labour market.  The reduction in
equity prices and financial wealth that marked the early stages
of the current recession would make financing retirement, or
leisure more generally, more difficult for instance.  That may
have pushed up on the participation rate of older workers in
particular (Chart 6).(3)
(1) See Saleheen and Shadforth (2006) and Barwell (2007).
(2) See Gomes (2009) for evidence of the cyclicality of UK labour market flows.
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Chart 5 Estimates of net inward migration by
citizenship(a)
Source:  ONS International Passenger Survey. 
(a) Estimates of net long-term international migration by citizenship.  Data are non seasonally
adjusted.  2009 data are provisional, and are available up to 2009 Q3. 
(b) The A8 countries are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia.  Prior to 2004, net inward migration from the A8 is included in the ‘Other’ bar,
because the split between net inward migration from the A8 and from other countries is not
available. 
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Chart 6 Participation rates
Source:  ONS (including the Labour Force Survey). 
(a) Recessions are defined as at least two consecutive quarters of falling output (at constant
market prices) estimated using the latest data.  The recessions are assumed to end once
output began to rise.
(b) Percentage of the 16+ population.  Rolling three-month measure. 
(c) Percentage of the population aged 50–64 for men and 50–59 for women.  Rolling 
three-month measure.  The observations before 1992 are based on non seasonally adjusted,
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Chart 4 UK population growth:  net inward migration
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These changes in actual participation can in turn affect
medium-term participation.  For example, some people who
leave (or choose not to enter) the labour force may be less
able to retain or acquire the skills sought by employers.  And
decisions to enter education, retire, or look after the family or
home may not be easily reversed.  
The impact of the crisis and the recession on medium-term
participation may, however, be smaller now than in the past.
In the early 1990s, institutional features — such as the
availability of early retirement packages and access to
disability benefits — are thought to have encouraged declining
participation of older age groups (Chart 6).  But the
availability of these features has been scaled back significantly.
That too could account for the most recent data in which the
impact on participation appears, so far at least, to have been
relatively muted.  Furthermore, the fall in participation since
early 2008 has been more than accounted for by those under
25 years old, many of whom may have re-entered education.
To the extent that these people eventually return to the
workforce, with improved skills, that may serve to attenuate
some of the fall in supply potential. 
Unemployment
A defining feature of an economic downturn is a pronounced
rise in unemployment.  This can give rise to a risk of increased
labour market ‘mismatch’, whereby people who are out of
work for longer spells see their skills deteriorate, meaning they
may no longer have the appropriate expertise looked for by
businesses.  Alternatively, the unemployed may simply be
living too far away from companies that would like to hire
them and regional mobility may be limited.  Mismatch could
be further exacerbated by large-scale restructuring of
economic activity away from some industries (such as
property-related sectors) and towards others (such as the
export sector), meaning that the unemployed do not possess
the skills, training or experience to quickly take up positions in
faster-growing industries.
Economic studies have used labour market mismatch to help
explain the rise and persistence of unemployment across
Europe in the 1980s.  This raised the possibility that the labour
market was subject to ‘hysteresis’, whereby temporary events
have long-lasting effects.(1) These effects, triggered by a
cyclical rise in unemployment, could manifest themselves in
people remaining unemployed for longer, which may in turn
lead to higher equilibrium unemployment.  
In the United Kingdom, the long-term unemployment rate is
currently lower than in the mid-1980s and early 1990s 
(Chart 7), although it has continued to rise in recent months.
The lower level of long-term unemployment indicates that any
hysteresis-type effect may be smaller than suggested by
previous experiences.  But there remains considerable
uncertainty about how the labour market will evolve and,
given the rise in the unemployment rate to 8%, there remains
a risk that long-term unemployment might rise further.
Capital
The supply capacity of the economy depends in part on the
amount of capital available to companies.  Theoretically,
capital includes a range of inputs, including both tangible
assets — such as plant and machinery, buildings, vehicles and
information technology — and intangible assets — such as
copyrights, patents, trademarks and alike.  In practice, the
official data may not properly capture the importance of all of
the assets.(2) In the very long run, there is an equilibrium level
of capital services, the size of which depends on fundamental
influences such as the level of technology, the size of the
population and the level of global interest rates.  Over long
time periods, businesses may adjust their actual capital
holdings towards this desired level.  But a more relevant
measure for how much could be produced by businesses now
— and, hence, potential supply — is the current level of capital
available to them.  Capital may be affected through gross
investment, scrapping and asset-life lengthening, each of
which will now be examined. 
The obvious channel through which capital can be affected in a
recession is through lower business investment.  This tends to
fall sharply during downturns (Chart 8) as companies revise
down their expectations of future demand and become
unwilling to invest in an uncertain economic climate.
Investment has been particularly weak during the recent
recession, perhaps reflecting an additional impact from the
financial crisis.  Companies may have found it more expensive
(1) See Blanchard and Summers (1986), Jackman and Roper (1987) and Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991).
(2) See Marrano and Haskel (2006).  The composition and quality of capital assets which
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Chart 7 Unemployment rate by duration(a)
Sources:  ONS (including the Labour Force Survey) and Bank calculations.
(a) Annual data.  Data prior to 1992 are based on LFS microdata.  These annual observations
correspond to the March-May quarter. 110 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
to access the external funding they need to finance investment
projects and, in some cases, they may not have been able to
access external finance at all.  Although business investment
flows are small relative to the size of capital services, the
unprecedented decline in business investment during the
recession will have materially weakened capital services
growth.
The implications of weak investment spending depend
primarily on the extent to which investment projects have
been deferred into the future rather than abandoned
altogether.  If companies decide to go back to projects that
were previously postponed, strong investment in the recovery
may partly compensate for the weakness in the recession.  But
past experiences show that investment is often slow to
recover, perhaps reflecting some build-up of excess capacity,
meaning that the impact on the level of capital services may
persist.
A second channel through which capital can be affected is
changes in its lifespan.  Recessionary periods tend to lead to a
rise in company liquidations (Chart 9).  Some of the capital
held by such distressed companies may be scrapped, rather
than sold in a secondary market.  Such capital scrapping
appeared to occur in the early 1980s when assets, particularly
plant and machinery in manufacturing, were scrapped before
their normal service lives were reached.(1)
The rise in liquidations during the recent recession, however,
appears more moderate than might have been expected given
the fall in output and the depth of the financial crisis (Chart 9).
That may be a result of a relatively healthy position of the
corporate sector prior to the crisis, or increased forbearance on
the part of the banks and tax authorities.  Or it may reflect the
policy response of both the monetary and fiscal authorities to
the crisis.  Lower-than-expected corporate liquidations may
indicate that premature scrapping has had less of an impact on
capital than has been typical in the past.  Official capital stock
data do try to capture capital scrapping (drawing on
information on corporate default rates) but this is a difficult
process.  So there remains considerable uncertainty
surrounding capital measures in the presence of premature
scrapping.(2)
Set against the capital scrapping effect during a downturn is
the possibility that, for those businesses that remain active,
the effective lifetime of the installed capital may increase.  For
example, companies may choose to hold on to their machines
for longer as reduced utilisation leads to less wear and tear.
For any given level of investment, such asset-life lengthening
would thus raise the level of available capital services.  
The net effect on supply through changes in the lifespan of
capital is ambiguous given that these capital scrapping and
life-lengthening channels point in different directions.  But
given that insolvencies have remained relatively low, this
suggests that this channel through to potential supply is
weaker than in the past. 
Productivity (TFP) 
Much of the variation in actual output over the cycle appears
to reflect changes in the efficiency with which companies
combine their labour and capital inputs:  their total factor
productivity (TFP).  So movements in potential output might
also be expected to reflect movements in equilibrium TFP.
Some of the channels fit neatly into the typical description of
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Chart 9 Company liquidations in England and Wales
Sources:  The Insolvency Service and ONS. 
(a) Recessions are defined as in Chart 6.  
(b) Chained-volume measure at market prices. 
(c) Data are to 2010 Q1.  Changes to legislation, data sources and methods of compilation mean
the statistics should not be treated as a continuous and consistent time series.  Since the
Enterprise Act 2002, a number of administrations have subsequently converted to creditors’
voluntary liquidations.  These liquidations are excluded from the headline figures published
by The Insolvency Service and excluded from the chart.
(1) See Oulton and Srinivasan (2003) for a general discussion of scrapping. 
(2) See ONS (2009).Research and analysis The impact of the financial crisis on supply 111
for when measuring other inputs and so, by default, are
captured in the TFP component.  In broad terms, TFP is a
residual that may reflect not only trend productivity growth,
but other factors, such as the quality of capital and labour and
influences from working capital.  Below we discuss the main
channels through which TFP may be affected.
First, TFP may have been adversely affected by a reduction in
the number of new businesses.  For example, prospective
businesses may have found it harder to access the funding they
need to start trading.  This effect may have been exacerbated
in the recent period given the financial nature of the shock.
These businesses may be particularly important as a source of
productivity growth, through the implementation of new
technologies for instance.  And they may also increase
competition, forcing existing businesses to improve their
operating efficiency.  However, after falling around the start of
2008, company incorporations have started to rise again
(Chart 10), perhaps indicating that the effect on TFP through
lower start-ups was relatively small during the recent
recession.
Second, certain features of the recession may exacerbate the
impact on productivity, particularly if it is more productive
sectors that are exposed.  For example, productivity in the
financial sector may have fallen back in the recent recession as
lower demand for financial products stymied innovation.  As
measured by the ONS, financial sector output grew rapidly
from the mid-1990s onwards (Chart 11).  To the extent that
the pace of growth of this sector may be lower following the
crisis, overall output growth may be weaker.  More generally,
sterling’s depreciation may have reduced the threat from
foreign competitors, lowering the incentive for businesses
operating in the most open UK markets to increase efficiency.
A third channel through which measured TFP might be
affected is through changes in inputs that are unobservable, or
difficult to measure.  These could be intangible investment
assets, such as copyrights or patents, which would perhaps be
more appropriately reflected in measures of capital or labour.
Indeed, research suggests that intangible assets would, in
reality, probably form a large part of investment (Marrano and
Haskel (2006)).  But they can be difficult to measure, meaning
that their effects frequently show up in measured TFP.
Businesses may cut back on these intangible investments
during recessions, mechanically lowering measured TFP
growth.  And there may also be channels through to structural
TFP, for example if lower spending on training reduces
individuals’ productivity growth.
A fourth channel through which measuredTFP might be
affected is the working capital channel.  Businesses require
working capital to fund their day-to-day activities.  This can
come from a combination of internal cash flow, including
liquidating inventories (Benito (2005)), bank borrowing or
trade credit.(1) The tightening of corporate credit conditions
that resulted from the financial crisis may have made it harder
and more expensive for businesses to obtain working capital.
In a growth accounting framework, this impairment to
‘effective’ supply would show up in a weak TFP residual.
In turn, there are three main routes through which a reduction
in working capital might affect potential supply.  First,
businesses’ production processes may be disrupted without
access to sufficient working capital, meaning that the quantity
that they can effectively supply shrinks.  Survey evidence
certainly indicates that tight credit conditions may have made
it hard for some businesses to meet orders:  the proportion of
businesses in the CBI surveys reporting that external finance
was limiting output remained elevated throughout 2009 and
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Source:  Companies House. 
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Chart 11 Financial intermediation output and GDP
(a) Chained-volume measure at market prices. 
(b) Data prior to 1987 Q4 are annual.
(1) See the box on page 15 of the February 2009 Inflation Reportfor further details on
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Second, the higher cost of working capital will naturally lead to
a rise in businesses’ production costs.  With more expensive
credit, some businesses will need to pay a higher cost when
they borrow to cover wages and intermediate inputs.  As a
result, the effective price of these inputs will increase and
businesses may use fewer of them, thus lowering production
levels.  In this way, potential supply might be adversely
affected via the cost channel.
In addition, businesses’ need for working capital may lead
them to divert funds from other activities, indirectly affecting
potential supply.  For example, if businesses finance their 
short-term operations with funds previously intended for
capital expenditure, business investment will be weaker than
otherwise.  While this lowers demand, it would also reduce
supply through weaker capital services growth.  Businesses
whose activities or financial structure are considered more
risky may find it particularly difficult to access working capital.
To the extent that these businesses are a more significant
source of dynamism and technical progress, reductions in
working capital would reallocate resources from more to less
productive companies, thus lowering the average level of
productivity.
There is considerable evidence to support this picture of
businesses facing working capital constraints.  Both the British
Chambers of Commerce (BCC) survey and the Deloitte CFO
Survey pointed to businesses having to deal with severely
constrained cash flow.  The BCC cash-flow scores fell to record
low levels (Chart 13).  And chief financial officers in the
Deloitte CFO Survey reported that increasing cash flow would
be a top priority in 2010 (Chart 14). 
A shortage of working capital is likely therefore to have played
a significant role in constraining the output of some
companies.  But this effect is unlikely to persist as working
capital constraints ease.    
Implications for the evolution of potential
supply
The path of potential supply is a key concern for monetary
policy makers.  But potential output is difficult to measure as it
is both unobservable and can be defined in a number of
different ways.  As such, it is easy to see why competing
studies provide such a wide range of estimated effects.  This
article has applied a growth accounting ‘bottom-up’ approach
to understand the channels through which supply may have
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Chart 12 Credit and finance as a constraint on output(a)
Sources:  CBI and ONS.
(a) This measure is produced by weighting together balances for the manufacturing sector and
the consumer/business service sector using shares in nominal value added.  Manufacturing
companies are asked:  ‘What factors are likely to limit output over the next three months?’.
Service sector companies are asked:  ‘What factors are likely to limit your ability to increase

















Chart 13 Survey indicators of businesses’ cash-flow
positions(a)
Sources:  BCC and Bank calculations.
(a) Companies are asked:  ‘During the last three months how has your cash flow changed:
improved/same/worsened?’. 
(b) Averages since 1992. 
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Chart 14 Chief financial officers’ top priorities in 2010(a)
Source:  The Deloitte CFO Survey 2009 Q4. 
(a) Deloitte asked CFOs to select their top three priorities for 2010 from a list of ten.  The score
for each factor above is the percentage of CFOs that have included the factor in their top
three priorities.  The chart shows the top seven factors selected by CFOs.Research and analysis The impact of the financial crisis on supply 113
It is likely that the downturn has resulted in a fall in
companies’ effective supply capacity through a number of the
channels described above.  That is consistent with both the
resilience in inflation and survey estimates of spare capacity
within companies.  In particular, both capital and labour inputs
are likely to be negatively affected, and the efficiency with
which these inputs are combined may have also deteriorated
somewhat.  
The developments observed in the data can shed some light on
the relative impact these channels have on supply.  In
particular, relative to the decline in output, employment has
fallen by less than in previous recessions.  That suggests the
deterioration in equilibrium employment may be less acute
relative to past experiences.  Similarly, although the number of
insolvencies has risen, it has so far done so by less than might
be expected given the fall in output, pointing to less capital
scrapping than may have been expected.  Other evidence,
however, points to larger effects on supply.  Investment has
fallen substantially in the recession, pushing down on the level
of capital services available to businesses.  And the available
evidence indicates that companies’ working capital is likely to
have restricted their effective supply.  But significant
uncertainty remains around the extent to which supply
capacity has been impaired through all of these channels.
Future developments in supply also remain uncertain.  If credit
conditions ease, working capital effects on supply are likely to
dissipate quickly.  Also, if the economic recovery proves robust,
some of the negative supply effects may be more muted than
expected, while others may be partly reversed.  Indeed,
according to a recent survey by the Bank’s Agents, most
companies appear not to have permanently reduced their
supply capacity.(1) For example, a majority of businesses
reported that they could increase output by more than 5%
without a material increase in recruitment or capital
expenditure.  However, if demand growth proves anaemic, the
effects of higher unemployment and lower participation on
labour supply, together with increased capital scrapping and
cancelled investment projects, would bear down more
persistently on the economy’s supply potential.  
Given this uncertainty, monitoring the supply side of the
economy will, as ever, be vital in assessing the balance
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply.  Such an
assessment, and associated monetary policy actions, is
necessary to ensure that the inflation target is met in the
medium term. 
(1) For further discussion, see page 31 of the May 2010 Inflation Report.114 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q2
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